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Introduction 
This document is a summary of 16 key research and game findings focused 
specifically on the characteristics of civil-military response to a pandemic 
scenario. The numbered bullets below correspond to more detailed explanations 
of findings presented later in the document. While these findings are in no way 
definitive or complete, they are a sampling of relevant guidance based on research, 
gaming and expert opinion. It is our hope that these 16 findings will contribute to 
improving civilian and military effectiveness in humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response operations. 
  
Note on Urban Outbreak 2019 
The document references “Urban Outbreak 2019,” which was an analytic war 
game designed, delivered and analyzed by NWC’s Humanitarian Response 
Program in collaboration with Uniformed Services University of the Health 
Sciences (USUHS) - National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health 
(NCDMPH) and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab. In September 
2019, Urban Outbreak brought together 50 experts from five different sectors who 
averaged 10 years of humanitarian response experience. Over two days they 
gamed an infectious disease outbreak response in a notional but realistic city with 
a population of 21 million people. As part of the game, players individually voted 
for up to five essential organizations to which they needed access in order to 
complete the activities they deemed essential for success in the response. 
Histograms of those votes are offered in appendix I & II. The scenario-based 
aspects of the game that focused specifically on the unique characteristics of urban 
response in a widespread outbreak are also listed in appendix III. 
 
Select Research & Game Findings1 
1. Early actions and planning across all sectors are exponentially more 
important than reactive measures once the disease is widespread. 
 
2. There will be intense and overwhelming demands for access to a few key 
health related organizations that are viewed as authorities in the early 
stages of a response. As the response moves forward, the number of 
stakeholders who are in high demand will increase and diversify. 
 
 
1 The views presented by the faculty and contributors do not reflect official positions of the Naval War 
College, DON or DOD. 
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3. While a response will often focus on serving the infected, any response 
must also focus on all the ways to lower the R “naught” or R0 (the average 
number of people infected by each new person infected). Regularly 
identifying high-risk practices that raise the R0 and replacing them with 
suitable alternatives for a population is an exceptionally difficult and 
absolutely essential factor for success. 
 
4. Forced mass quarantine or other top down approaches to an outbreak that 
securitize the response with law enforcement and/or military enforcement 
may not be successful and could increase the spread of the disease. 
 
5. Questioning the data central to planning and operations in an outbreak is 
an essential reflex that needs to be developed and sustained throughout an 
organization. 
 
6. Currently, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19 
outbreak than lab confirmed case counts. These facts on the ground are 
inherently lagging a couple weeks behind infections, but without real time 
and widespread testing of infections, mortality offers tangible and reliable 
data. Mortality “doubling time” is the most important and widely accessible 
metric for winning the race against COVID-19 in the absence of extensive 
testing.  
 
7. Establish local media relationships early for risk communication as 
outbreak intensifies. In order to effectively combat misinformation and 
rumors, risk communication should be hyper-local, establish a track record 
for truth early, and directly involve known community members with a 
stated focus of honesty over polished language or production value.  
 
8. Responders may be overconfident if they are not directly connected to the 
field. Frontline healthcare workers and first responders are often a good 
source of realistic assessments. 
 
9. Personal and professional risk tolerance for humanitarian response 
activities is generally much higher for non-governmental organizations and 
medical first responders than it is for the military and U.S. government 
employees. 
 
10. Even in the planning phase, the military and government may (consciously 
or unconsciously) exhibit avoidance behaviors to limit the scope of their 
involvement with affected and/or infected populations in the field.  
 
11. A highly unusual mission and/or unprecedented response conditions such 
as pandemic response will meet with significant resistance, even among 
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experienced professionals. This can directly inhibit effective planning and 
adaptation.  
 
12. Private sector organizations are an absolutely essential and uniquely 
nimble component of any large-scale response. They must be integrated 
into planning throughout all phases of a response. 
 
13. The U.S. government may need to clarify the difference between an 
“outbreak response” and a “humanitarian disaster” though these activities 
are not mutually exclusive. 
 
14. Health care, drugs or other treatments should be provided through 
whatever means people are accustomed to within their local communities. 
 
15. Social norms will change during a period of crisis; this demands careful 
observation and adaptation. 
 
16. Responding organizations may not be aware that some response activities 
will not scale to meet the demands of an outbreak as they might for other 
disasters. 
 
Expanded Findings  
 
1. Early actions and planning are exponentially more important than 
reactive measures once the disease is widespread. 
Any containment strategy requires testing and tracing. This is not possible once a 
large enough population is infected. In the same way, altering business, social or 
cultural practices is significantly less effective when a society is facing a wide 
range of new challenges, especially severe economic and social pressures. Clarity, 
speed and repetition are essential for changes within a population and are most 
effectively achieved before other factors start making decisions for them. 
Generally, any action taken after a virus is widespread will be less effective due to 
the virus’ impact on society. The larger and more complicated the action, the 
more the impact of the disease will be felt in its execution.  
 
2. There will be intense and overwhelming demand for access to a few key 
health related organizations that are viewed as authorities in the early 
stages of a response. As the response moves forward, the number of 
stakeholders who are in high demand will increase and diversify. 
Urban Outbreak Example: After a shared briefing, 66% of the players voted that 
the Ministry of Health was the most essential stakeholder to which they needed 
access to complete their response activities during the initial outbreak. When 
players voted again after the briefing at the apex of the outbreak, their priorities 
for access had diversified by approximately 20% across a wider range of 
stakeholders. Players also voted to add approximately 30% more stakeholders as 
essential to their response activities. See histograms below. 
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3. While a response will often focus on serving the infected, any response 
must also focus on all the ways we can lower the R0. 
Pandemics are a function of human behavior mixed with a pathogen that has a 
specific R “naught” or R0.  The R0 represents a simple average of how many 
people each infected person will infect. So R1.5 would mean everyone who gets 
the disease gives it to one and a half other people. The important thing to 
remember is the R3 means an exponential growth curve for the disease but it is 
not a fixed number. The R0 is a product of all the behaviors and environmental 
factors that result in those three new infections. So if society can change how they 
behave or alter the environment to lower that R3 to an R1 (or lower) while 
treating the infected, the disease will not be able to replicate enough to survive. In 
some cases this could be as simple as hand washing or social distancing, in other 
cases like Ebola it may clash with longstanding cultural practices like body 
preparation and burial by hand. Regularly identifying these high-risk practices 
that raise the R0 and replacing them with suitable alternatives for a 
population is an exceptionally difficult and absolutely essential factor for 
success. 
 
4. Forced mass quarantine or any other top down approach to an outbreak 
securitizes the response. This may not be successful and could increase the 
spread of the disease. 
Sick people actively seeking care, testing and public health messages concerning 
self-isolation and quarantine of contacts are the ways to end outbreaks. Forced 
mass quarantines are a direct barrier to those activities. One cannot slow the 
spread of disease if people hide infections out of fear or stigma. When authorities 
attempt to enforce a mass quarantine on a large population they will not be 100% 
effective. By stigmatizing the infection and symptoms they will teach others to 
hide their symptoms and drive key populations underground. This results in less 
sharing of information with authorities and medical providers, and the most 
desperate and the highest risk populations will seek to break quarantine. 
 
5. Questioning the data central to planning and operations in an outbreak is 
an essential reflex that needs to be developed and sustained throughout an 
organization. 
Data collection, analysis and dissemination in a disaster response are by their very 
nature contentious political activities. Responders require data to execute their 
responses but rarely do the data collection and analysis themselves. This can lead 
to a significant weakness related to outbreaks as responders can base too many of 
their major decisions on external findings that may be dated, inaccurate, or 
misleading.  
  
Example from Urban Outbreak: There was no questioning or rejection of the 
epidemiological reports given to the players even though the infection curve did 
not follow the normal trajectory for this type of outbreak. This was especially 
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apparent in the final round when there was no clear indicator of why the reported 
number of infections had fallen dramatically and yet many of the players 
embraced the idea that it was due to a successful response. This was concerning 
because designers anticipated questions about data collection and reliability by 
such a wide array of seasoned experts but not blind acceptance of such abnormal 
reports. 
  
6. Currently, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19 
outbreak than lab confirmed case counts. These facts on the ground are 
inherently lagging a couple weeks behind infections, but without real time 
and widespread testing of infections, mortality offers tangible and reliable 
data. 
While there is a great deal of data emerging about infection rates in the United 
States it is inherently behind the infection curve, incomplete and unreliable. For 
this reason, mortality is a better indicator of the scale of the COVID-19 outbreak 
than lab confirmed case counts. While even this number has room for error and 
each death for COVID-19 is estimated to take 13-17 days - causing a long lag 
between interventions and results. It is more manageable data and allows rough 
calculations for decision-making. For example, instead of attempting to measure 
the number of infected, experts have offered that lengthening the number of days 
it takes mortality to double or  “doubling time” is the most important and 
widely accessible metric for winning the race against COVID-19 in the 
absence of extensive testing. The further from three days the doubling time gets, 
the further a population is from the runaway period of the pandemic.  
 
7. Establish local media relationships early for risk communication as 
outbreak intensifies. 
Urban Outbreak Example: Upon reaching the apex of the outbreak in round two 
NGOs and some U.S. Government (USG) independently identified a shift from 
national to local media outlets and dissemination, focusing on TV, radio, and 
billboards for “carpet bombing” public health messaging (as opposed to web, 
national or international) in order to build local trust, relevance, and community 
response rate. It will also increase a responder’s control over speed of delivery 
and accuracy.   
 
When focused on protecting public health, authenticity, truth and actionable 
information are the currency of successful risk communications. This is directly at 
odds with crisis communication, which is intended to shape messages to defend, 
protect or promote a particular brand or interest. In a sustained crisis the public 
will become increasingly dismissive of messages that don’t reflect the immediacy 
or intensity of their experience or sentiments. In order to effectively combat 
misinformation and rumors, risk communication should be hyper-local, 
establish a track record for truth early, and directly involve known 
community members with a stated focus of honesty over polished language 
or production value. To maintain legitimacy in risk communication, 
inconsistencies in messages, response failures and/or public expressions of 
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intense anger or grief should not be omitted or censored. Instead, they should be 
voiced, explained and offered as legitimate and understandable aspects of a 
community wide crisis.  
 
8. Responders may be overconfident if they are not directly connected to the 
field. Frontline healthcare workers are often a good source of more realistic 
assessments. 
Example from Urban Outbreak: Players in round one (early onset) and round two 
(outbreak apex) were asked to rank their confidence in their ability to complete 
their priority activities if they had full access to those essential stakeholders they 
selected. In their post move survey they were asked to rate their assessment of the 
impact their priority activities would have on the overall response. There was no 
significant change in confidence by any group except for Bravo Cell even though 
the outbreak grew exponentially. Participants in Bravo Cell – (NGO players), were 
statistically less confident in their ability to achieve their first priority activity 
between move one and move two. This confidence measure was from the only 
group focused on directly serving the affected population through medical care 
and other local programing. They were inherently more connected to the reality of 
directly running diverse patient-facing medical and public health programs. They 
are also highly aware of the personal risks they have to manage or mitigate as the 
programmatic leads in the field. 
 
9. Personal and professional risk tolerance for humanitarian response 
activities is generally much higher for non-governmental organizations and 
medical first responders than it is for the military and US government 
employees. 
Urban Outbreak Example: Humanitarian organizations were significantly more 
engaged in the problem set on the ground than their military or government 
counterparts. While fully aware of security and logistical challenges in front of 
them, humanitarians and healthcare workers think in terms of baseline conditions 
for access, program rollout and sustainment first and consider complicating 
factors second. Military and government generally focus on authorities, mission 
parameters, personal security and other similar issues for an exceedingly longer 
time before even considering the functional factors involved in the effective 
execution of a mission or program. As the military and government engage in that 
early planning phase, they identify a great deal more reasons why they cannot do 
something rather than how they can. It is the opposite for humanitarians and 
healthcare workers because their work is predicated on the idea of responding 
unless there is an absolutely unacceptable risk. This can lead to cultural clash 
when collaborating. For example in Urban Outbreak, humanitarians became 
frustrated with discussion points offered by the military and USAID explaining: 
“Health care workers don’t need to waste time discussing coordination or mission 
drift – coordination is an activity you do and our mission is the population in front of 
us.” 
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10. Even in the planning phase, the military and government may 
(consciously or unconsciously) exhibit avoidance behaviors to limit the 
scope of their involvement with affected and/or infected populations in the 
field.  
Urban Outbreak Example: This was highly apparent across a wide range of 
military and USG (e.g. CDC, HHS, USAID) players. Avoidance behaviors were most 
often exhibited as redirection of discussions and moves related to serving affected 
populations towards nebulous high-level policy issues, minutia of command 
structures, and coordination imperatives. When pushed towards planning direct 
response activities, these players often used coordination with other “expert” 
organizations to passively externalize any personal or organizational risk of direct 
engagement with the population. The fact that these players knew the infection in 
the game was curable (with moderate immunity) with just two doses of antibiotics 
but actively avoided discussing distribution, or prophylactic force protection, 
lends credence to this interpretation.  Humanitarians almost exclusively voted for 
affected/infected populations, as their most essential stakeholder to access, while 
other players did not vote for them at all. This shows a significant gap in the 
response community, as direct assistance to the infected will be a primary and 
overwhelming task in a pandemic.  
 
11. A highly unusual mission and/or unprecedented response conditions 
will meet with significant resistance, even among experienced professionals. 
This can directly inhibit effective planning and adaptation.  
In the design and execution of the Urban Outbreak, experts at all levels sometimes 
vehemently rejected those game elements that they felt were too foreign to their 
experience. The original pathogen proposed for the game had an R0 closer to the 
COVID-19 virus, exhibited itself with cold and flu like symptoms, and required 
long-term intensive medical care for a small portion of the population. This 
proposal was rejected for a variant of a known and curable bacterial pathogen. 
The learning opportunity lost by failing to use the original pathogen proposed is 
now obvious. 
  
Urban Outbreak Example: During gameplay players would often exhibit physical 
discomfort and become argumentative concerning those aspects of the scenario 
that did not conform to their previous experience. This occurred even when other 
experts in the room would vouch for the scenario’s veracity and relevance. The 
concern is that these reactions generally led resistant players to ignore or 
overlook good resources and guidance in their problem solving. If left unchecked it 
can often lead to a groupthink sentiment of “different is dangerous,” with an 
obvious impact on effectiveness. This was exhibited in the game as key groups 
failed to engage in new and different aspects of the scenario (e.g. unique urban 
environment, mass antibiotic distribution, cooperation with local gangs) and 
instead retreated to exploration of known quantities, (e.g. C2 structures or 
information gathering activities). 
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12. Private sector organizations are an absolutely essential and uniquely 
nimble component of any large-scale response. 
Urban Outbreak Example: A lead for a private sector logistics company offered 
some of the most tangible and innovative approaches to the problem set. The 
solution from his standpoint was to maintain business continuity (even while 
taking losses) by ensuring everyone on his payroll and their families had early 
access to antibiotics. He was confident his business would already have devoted 
members of local gangs and their families on the payroll as employees and so his 
early interest in their health and safety would open up the supply lines he would 
be able to use throughout the response. However, he had no interest in using 
overland shipping options due to security concerns and poor road infrastructure 
and instead sought to ferry all goods on waterways by employing a public private 
partnership with the local transit authority. With this strategy he was able to 
divide up most of the population centers and reach them without military support, 
air assets or many changes to his existing business model. 
 
13. The U.S. Government may need to clarify the difference between an 
“outbreak response” and a “humanitarian disaster” though these activities 
are not mutually exclusive. 
Urban Outbreak Example: There was broad agreement among USG players that 
round one was an “outbreak response” which required more of a testing, contact 
tracing and health advisory role while round two was a “humanitarian disaster” 
requiring a different approach. There was still limited discussion of actually 
engaging the infected population. Priorities became personal security, disease 
surveillance, restricting movement by decentralizing resources, and looking for 
public health response mechanisms outside of health systems (e.g. sanitation 
efforts).   
 
14. Health care, drugs or other treatments should be provided through 
whatever means people are accustomed within their communities. 
Urban Outbreak Example: In order to implement programs that are quickly 
accepted and effective with minimal disruption in dense urban areas, the 
international response needed to provide drugs, testing and aid through pre-
established pharmacies, community organizations, religious leaders or 
practitioners without caveats. 
 
15. Social norms will change during a period of crisis. 
Some changes may be characterized as normal coping mechanisms, but flagrant 
criminal activity must be actively pursued to reinforce social norms. The black 
market will inevitably become a critical factor as market pressures increase risk, 
reward and opportunity. Crime will also increase given the same factors, but 
including economic desperation and an opportunistic “testing” of authorities’ 
control. Drug use, alcoholism and domestic abuse will noticeably increase. Every 
action by authorities may have magnified implications for individuals, families and 
communities. 
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16. Responding organizations may not be aware that some response 
activities will not scale in the way that they normally would. 
Urban Outbreak Example: Red Cross Movements continuously took the role of 
respectful and culturally appropriate mortuary affairs but they were never asked 
how they would manage disposal of 90,000 bodies in three months nor did they 
ever explain that capability. Under normal circumstances this wouldn’t be an 
issue, but under extreme circumstances even highly effective and established 
organizations should reconsider their capacity over their capabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contributing Authors 
Benjamin Davies 
Kaitlin Rainwater Lovett   
Brittany Card 
David Polatty 
 
Analytic Contributors 
Alexandra Whiting 
David Weinstein 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Note on Results Interpretation 
The following histograms from Urban Outbreak 2019 show vote type and 
frequency from fifty players but they also show vote priority. Players were 
instructed that their vote order meant higher or lower levels of access to the 
external stakeholders they selected. A player’s first vote was their highest priority 
stakeholder descending to their fifth vote. Players could choose from a list of 100 
pre-identified organizations or add organizations. The first histogram shows the 
vote following the initial outbreak and activation of a response. The second 
histogram shows the vote at the height of the outbreak. 
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Appendix III 
 
Urban Challenges and Areas of Inquiry in Urban Outbreak 2019 Scenario    
 
Round One: Outbreak 
• Concept of employing informal public health providers in the response 
• Concept of informal governance/security for access or mobility for 
vulnerable populations in key dense urban areas 
• Establishing role of private security 
• Determining differential access to resources based on social strata and 
location  
• Assessment data from rural mountainous region 
• Self-interested government officials and private sector actors 
• Prostitution as a vector 
• False information/suspicion concerning the outbreak and response 
 
Round Two: Cascading Failures 
• Loss of power, utilities, dockworkers, security, etc. 
• Failure of existing medical system 
• All other medical services severely affected  
• Logistical capacity stretched for outbreak response purposes at the 
expense of all else 
• Hoarding, theft, and black market becomes extremely lucrative 
• Increased international military role 
• Challenges for responder security and ROE for military 
• Ambiguous role of the national government 
• Role of informal transit for response 
• Flight of populations 
• Quarantine/roadblocks 
• Mortuary affairs  
• PPE and medical demand 
 
Round Three: Cleanup Wish List  
• Pre-transition change in priorities 
• Engineering, heavy lift or logistics from international military before 
transition begins/departure 
• Reviving broken livelihoods 
• Mortuary affairs 
• Refuse in urban areas 
• Security - rise of gangs and religious groups 
• Badly damaged infrastructure 
• Hobbled workforce 
• Extreme needs associated with fractured health system (public health 
emergencies associated with those failures) 
